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Iraq Revisited

By BrianHull | July 24, 2008

Update (8-1-2008)
The Rand Corporation just released a study of 648 terror groups that had existed between the years of 1968 and 2006.  The report, entitled How Terrorist Groups End, “indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory.”  This should have a significant impact on the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and should lead to a profound reanalysis of how the U.S. fights the “global war on terrorism.”  Unfortunately, it probably won’t.  The U.S. still thinks the best way to solve delicate problems is to blow up as much stuff as possible.

There’s much ado about Iraq these days: the surge bringing lower levels of violence, the lack of progress on political reconciliation, Western companies getting no-bid oil contracts, the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki calling for a timetable for U.S. withdrawal, etc.  The media has once again decided that Iraq is a place worth talking about, and this is in large part due the presidential campaign and to the politics surrounding Obama’s decision to visit.  Last year, I wrote extensively about the situation in Iraq, but at that time the effects of the surge and other notable (and more important) factors were not yet known.  That article was written after the levels of violence had peaked in late 2006 and early 2007 and using the most current data of the first six months of 2007.  Now, with the levels of violence falling appreciably, a reanalysis is warranted with regard to the U.S. military presence in Iraq, and by extension its possible effectiveness in bringing about positive changes to a nation which has suffered greatly under military occupation for over 5 years.  Additionally, it’s crucial to ask ourselves the very important question, “now what?”

The most fundamental issues for consideration are the levels of violence, and what they mean for the Iraqis and for the U.S. and coalition troops in Iraq.  It’s undeniable that Iraq is a much less violent place now than it had been in late 2006 and early 2007, at the height of sectarian bloodshed.  But it would be foolish to state that Iraq is a nation at peace.  In the last week of May 2008, there were roughly 350 attacks in Iraq.  On average, there were about 50 attacks every single day.  While this is far fewer than the nearly 1550 in June of 2007, it is about the same number of attacks as occurred in May of 2004, one year after “mission accomplished.”  In the four years since, Iraq has exploded in violence and has brought that violence back to the same level.  One could look at the last 4 years as a complete waste of time.

But violence has been reduced, and that’s a good thing.  The question to ask is why.  What is different in Iraq today relative to 18 months ago that can help explain the reduction in violence?  Most people immediately point to the Surge as the sole causal agent for lower levels of violence, but the answer is actually five-fold: (1) the cease-fire called by Mutada al-Sadr, (2) the Sunni Awakening Councils which began fighting against Sunni insurgents, (3) over four million displaced Iraqis, (4) a change in the calculation methodology of civilian deaths in Iraq, and (5) the Surge.

Here are three charts from the Department of Defense’s June 2008 report to Congress entitled Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.  These charts will help facilitate a better understanding of the five factors which reduced violence in Iraq.

#1 - Muqtada al-Sadr’s Cease Fire

In late August of 2007, Muqtada called upon the members of his Mahdi army to stop fighting U.S. and British troops and rival Shiite and Sunni factions in Iraq.  He later extended that truce in February of 2008, on the two year anniversary of the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra which preceded (and also underscores) the profound increase in sectarian tension and conflict.  Once labeled by the Pentagon as one of the most destabilizing forces in Iraq, even more than Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Mahdi Army’s cease-fire has led to dramatic reductions in violence.

Why did al-Sadr call the cease-fire? The Mahdi Army grew too big, unruly, and undisciplined to be effectively managed.  Muqtada wants and needs to be seen as a legitimate and credible political leader in Iraq.  In order to change his reputation from that of a murderous tyrant to something much cleaner and “respectable,” he made a distinct political calculation.  The Mahdi Army, similar to changes in Lebanon’s Hezbollah organization, is becoming more political, providing social programs for the development Iraqis. Additionally, by calling the cease-fire al-Sadr can present to all Iraqis and Americans that his movement honors his decisions.  He can demonstrate the power of his words by doing what came as a surprise to everyone, calling on his followers to stop the violence.  Those that disobey his command are exposed as illegitimate fighters of the Mahdi Army.  They are purged and marginalized from the Mahdi Army and even face fatal retribution.

A simple reason why al-Sadr is such an influential figure in Iraq’s Shi’a community is due to his family’s lineage and his father’s death at the hands of Saddam Hussein in February 1999. With his death of his father, a person who was one of “the most powerful Shiite clerics in Iraq in the late 1990s,” Muqtada became the figurehead of a large and powerful clerical dynasty.  For a more sophisticated and thorough biography of Muqtada al-Sadr read this, this, this, and especially this.

It is important to note that these decisions by Muqtada al-Sadr to call upon his Mahdi Army to lay down their arms and stop killing people is one of the most important factors in the reduction in violence in Iraq.  The question remains, though, how important was the Surge in influencing Muqtada’s decisions in August 2007, February 2008, and March 2008 to call for and maintain a cease-fire?  It is possible that al-Sadr would never have called for a cease-fire otherwise, and it is only due to a larger presence of American troops in Iraq that al-Sadr has advocated for an end to violence.  This ignores the simple fact that if Muqtada’s sole goal was to keep killing Americans in Iraq, more Americans in the country would allow for more targets.  No, the presence of more troops in Iraq due to the Surge cannot be taken as the main justification for al-Sadr’s decisions; it just doesn’t make sense.  Although direct military pressure and the reversal of territorial gains can be seen as possible secondary justifications, a more likely scenario, discussed above, is the reputation that was beginning to manifest around the Mahdi Army and Muqtada himself.  Muqtada needed to reverse this reputation so as to prevent a backlash similar to what was experienced by Al Qaeda in Iraq (see #2 below).

There is much more to Muqtada al-Sadr than meets the eye.  He is an intelligent and calculating political figure in Iraq.  And even with the crackdowns against his Sadr Organization in Basra, the Sadr City of Bahgdad, and now Amarah performed by the U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces, he will not relinquish his ability to use force in the future by freely handing over weapons to the central government. Instead, he made an announcement that the majority of his followers would lay down their weapons while the newly-established elite wing of the Mahdi Army would remain armed. He (legitimately) fears that the U.S. will be staying in Iraq much longer than the (totally arbitrary and toothless) December 31 deadline mandated by the U.N.  If this happens and the U.S. remains in Iraq “violating Iraq’s sovereignty,” then the Mahdi Army’s resistance against the U.S. troop presence will continue and perhaps become openly violent once again.

Iraqis want an end to the violence in Iraq much more than Americans (or anyone else) give them credit for.  They have been living under military occupation for five and a half years.  They have seen ethnic conflict unlike anything we could ever imagine.  And they’re sick of it.  They’re pissed off and losing patience with militias and/or the Iraqi government telling them that they can make their lives better. More than the U.S. troop surge, negative public sentiment towards the ineffectiveness of militia movements to provide a better life for those they claim they are fighting for has influenced Muqtada’s decisions.  Muqtada al-Sadr loves Iraq.  He has a weird way of showing it, but like most Iraqis, he is a nationalist.  He wants to help Iraqis and he wants to help his organization.  He is responding to the reactions of distressed Iraqis with regard to the methods used by the Mahdi Army by putting on a “moderate face.”  Muqtada is positioning himself by securing a positive sentiment among the Iraqi people for the eventual reduction in foreign troops in Iraq so that he will be in a stronger position to face his rivals, especially the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawa Party.

Moreover, with the provincial elections (theoretically) coming up in October (most likely early 2009), Muqtada needed to clean up his image if he and his Sadr organization are to be able to effectively influence the electoral outcome.  His political party boycotted the January 2005 election and is unlikely to field candidates in the upcoming election due to the ongoing government campaign, comprising mostly of rival Shiites, to suppress the Sadr Organization.  Rather than running candidates as Sadrists who will likely be the targets of direct political opposition through government harassment and arrest, they will be endorsing candidates from other political parties (i.e. Sadrists will very likely be running as candidates from other parties to gain access to government).

#2 - The Awakening Councils

The Awakening Councils are, simply, U.S.-funded Sunni groups who have agreed to fight against Al-Qaeda-linked insurgents.  A point of contention is that some of the members of these Awakening Councils are former insurgents who had previously been allied with Al-Qaeda and fought against U.S. troops in the past.  It’s feared, especially by the al-Maliki government, that these new armed Sunni groups could potentially oppose the Shiite-dominated government.  They may also be populated with Al Qaeda sympathizers “intent on infiltrating the Interior Ministry.” The U.S. military, however, decided that the benefits of arming every side of a potentially bloody civil war outweighed the costs of U.S. military deaths.  The Sunni Awakening Councils are credited with reducing violence in predominantly Sunni areas where Al Qaeda was able to move freely.

The strategy started small, first appearing in Anbar Provence in the end of 2005 / early 2006.  It has since grew to almost 75,000 men in eight provinces.  Why did this occur at all?  Why would Sunni insurgents who were previously allied with Al Qaeda suddenly turn against them?  In large part, it was a rejection of the tactics which Al Qaeda used that led to the reversal of support among the Sunni population in Iraq.  Anyone or any group  going around indiscriminately killing civilians will not garner much support among those who are dying.  That is what happened in Anbar Province, and that is what is happening across the country.  In an odd reaction to the growth of the Awakening Councils, Al Qaeda in Iraq has called on its members to “soften their tactics” in order to reclaim its popularity among the Sunnis who at one time enabled their violence.

Much like the cease-fire called by Muqtada al-Sadr, how much of the reduction of violence caused by the Awakening Councils can be attributed to the U.S. troop surge, or U.S. troops at all? The Sunni backlash against Al Qaeda began long before the troop surge was even announced, so there needs to be some disassociation between the two.  And while it must be acknowledged that the limited training received by member of the Awakening Councils primarily comes from the U.S. military, they are not trained en masse like the central government’s Security Forces or Iraqi Police.  In some parts of Iraq they are not trained at all.  Attributing any reduction of violence stemming from the existence of the Sunni Awakening Council to the U.S. military’s troop surge is disingenuous, except for the small percentage of members who actually receive training or cooperation from the U.S. military.  Again, this is a situation in which the reduction of violence is falsely credited to the Surge rather than the actual tactic which reduced violence, the Sunni fighters who now attack Al Qaeda.

One last critical point which needs to be addressed is that of money.  The members of the various Awakening Councils are on the U.S. military payroll, receiving about $300 a month for their services.  Many of them, it can only be assumed, accept the money because of the unsustainable rate of unemployment in the country.  And of course the Awakening Councils would not have spread so fast without this direct funding by the U.S.  Unfortunately, though, once the money stops flowing from the United States to the members of the Awakening Councils, their loyalties may shift.

#3 - Ethnic Cleansing

In too many ways, ethnic cleansing and displacement remain unconnected to the larger issue of violence.  Or more accurately, it is typically stated that violence leads to displacement as people flee their homes due to concern for their personal safety.  It is unfortunate, though, that more people do not follow the logic more fully.  Once certain ethnically diverse areas of the country become more homogenized due to ethnic cleansing, violence is reduced in those areas because there are fewer members of the minority ethnic group to attack, kill, harass, and oppress.  Millions of Iraqis have fled their homes because of the violence, and this, unfortunately, is another factor that has led to a reduction in violence.

The most recent report by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimates about 4.2 million displaced Iraqis.  There are roughly 2.2 million internally displaced people that have been forced out of their homes but are still living inside Iraq, and there are another 2 million Iraqi refugees living in “Syria, Jordan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey and several Gulf States.”  The CIA estimates the total population of Iraq to be about 28.2 million, meaning about 15% of the population have been forcibly removed from their homes through the threat or fear of violence.  Most previously mixed cities and neighborhoods are now ethnically homogenized.   And while the reduction in violence is positive, it comes with a heavy price.  It is unrealistic to believe that these displaced residents will ever be able return to their homes and live in peace.

#4 - Change in Calculation Methodology

There is a lot of confusions and disagreement over the actual numbers.  The numbers listed in the charts above are directly from the Department of Defense, however, many experts dispute them.  When government data is compared with nongovernment data (including the GAO, the NIE, the readiness of the ISF, the Associated Press, the Economist, and Iraq Body Count), the independent reporing is much more dire in their assesments.

Complications stem from the following:

(a) - The collection of information.  The U.S. military uses information provided by coalition troops and Iraqi incident reports.  This information doesn’t always agree.  The military claims that it is killing insurgents is refuted by Iraqi claims of civilian deaths.  As security operations are handed over to Iraqis, there is more missing information as Iraqi forces fail to report incidents that would demonstrate the true security situation in their areas. Additionally, the inability of the U.S. military to accurately track “Shiite-on-Shiite and Sunni-on-Sunni violence” leads to vast under-reporting.

(b) - Formulas measuring sectarian vs. nonsectarian violence.  There are multiple sources which demonstrate different levels of violence in Iraq.  Also, as the Awakening Councils grow into more areas of the country, civilian deaths and attacks attributed to them are not counted in official statistics.  Actually, any attack attributed to and U.S. allied group are “excluded from the U.S. military’s calculation of violence levels.”

(c) - Redefining violence.  “If a bullet went through the back of the head, it’s sectarian. If it went through the front, it’s criminal.”  Moreover, there is confusion with regard to what is combat related versus noncombat related death.

(d) - “Cherry-picking” - Selectively focusing on specific trends in violence can lead to the perception of military progress, and this selective use of statistical information can help the military enhance its case.

(e) - Classified information - We may never know the true nature of violence in Iraq.

A major problem with assessing the accuracy of these data is that there is no official system in place to account for the dead and to tally the numbers of civilian and insurgent deaths.  Measuring deaths in a war zone is complicated, especially when every side has its own armed security force and political motivations for reporting violence statistics a certain way.  How should attacks on civilians, Iraqi police, insurgents, U.S. and coalition forces be tabulated?  Is number of attacks more important, or number of deaths?  Are daily totals more important than monthly averages?  What should be done to get more reliable data regarding sectarian warfare and intra-sect combat?  All these issues make it nearly impossible to gauge accurately the level of violence in Iraq.  Regardless, it is very likely that although the magnitude of violence differs by organization measurements, the trends are similar.  There does seem to be less violence in Iraq now than there was previously.  What’s unknown is exactly how much violence actually occurs in Iraq.  Even though it is likely to be much higher than figures reported by the U.S. military, it is impossible to verify.

#5 - The Surge

Lastly, there is the actual effect of an increase in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq on the levels of violence in the country.  Back in January of 2007, the number of U.S. troops in Iraq stood at about 132,000.  This number grew gradually by about 5,000 per month until its peak of about 168,000 in September through November 2007, after which reductions began.  The Surge was declared as ending in November 2007 when it was announced that 5,000 soldiers would be removed due to the decline in violence.  Troop levels as of July 2008 are now back to pre-Surge levels.  The first troop surge operation (operation Fardh Al Qanoon) started on February 13, 2007 to quell the violence in Baghdad.  This operation was followed by other operations starting after the completion of the Surge in June 2007.

The level of civilian casualties started dropping after it reached its peak in December of 2006, so there is very little evidence to suggest that the troop surge which began in February 2007 with the Baghdad operation and was expanded after June 2007 is solely responsible for the reduction in civilian deaths.  The government data on civilian casualties does not support this claim.  There is evidence, however, to support the claim that the Surge had a positive impact on the number of security incidents.  Weekly measurements of attacks against infrastructure, bombings, sniper shootings, ambushes, and mortar, rocket and surface-to-air attacks were increasing (on average) from about March 2005 until early June 2007 (when the Surge hit its pinnacle).  From June until present, with few exceptions, these attacks have greatly decreased to levels not seen since early 2004.  It is difficult to know exactly how much this drop in attacks can be attributed solely to the Surge and how much can be attributed to the other four factors previously discussed.  The direct correlation between Surge and lower levels of violence is convincing and leads most media outlets to oversimplify the situation and disregard other plausible justifications for lower levels of attacks and civilian deaths, such as Muqtada’s cease-fire which began in August of 2007 (and correlated with a sharp drop in civilian deaths), the proliferation of the Awakening Councils which grew in number throughout most of 2007 (and can be correlated with lover levels of civilian deaths and attacks), ethnic cleansing which occurred through most of 2006 and 2007 (which can be reflected in the sharp increase in civilian deaths in later 2006 with a drop thereafter as neighborhoods became increasingly homogenized).

I think the Surge has had some marginal beneficial effects, in that the increase in American troops helped facilitate the Awakening Councils and has probably lowered violence in certain areas of the country, although I disagree with the claim that the Surge is the sole reason for lower levels of violence and attacks in Iraq.  Whether or not the surge had any appreciable effects on the situation in Iraq, and to what magnitude, is purely speculative.  The security situation is much more complicated in Iraq and the statement that “the Surge worked” is far too oversimplified.  The Surge may have worked, the Surge probably did have some positive effects when combined with other tactics, but much more significant than the Surge were Muqtada’s cease-fire, the Awakening Councils, and the effects of ethnic cleansing.  These three situations had a much more appreciable effect of the levels of violence and attacks in Iraq than did the Surge.

Those who wish to do violence against the American and coalition occupiers are free to do so as long as they have the cooperation from the local population.  There are only a relatively limited number of insurgents willing to pick up an assault rifle, plant an IED or EFP, or launch a mortar attack against American soldiers.  These people found support among a population upset with U.S. troops and contractors.  Once that cooperation started to falter, once the Iraqi public rejected the the tactics of the insurgents, violence declined.  And now, if one seeks to commit violence against U.S. troops, it’s much easier to do so along the Afghan-Pakistani border resulting is an increase in violence there.

I also disagree with the reasoning that we have to stay in Iraq in order to maintain the positive developments which have occurred in the country.  I can say this because I don’t believe the positive developments were directly caused solely by the U.S. troop presence.  There may have been indirect or an ancillary relationships as previously discussed, but no direct causation.  More U.S. troops alone do not equal positive developments in Iraq.  If the U.S. withdraws its troops the country will not slide into chaos and it will not be the next al-Qaeda training ground.

Moreover, the American public does not have the “intestinal fortitude” to carry out a long-term commitment in Iraq.  In Niall Ferguson’s 2004 book, Colossus, he discusses three deficits to America’s imperial effectiveness: an economic deficit, a manpower deficit, and (most importantly) an attention deficit.  While I disagree with him that an “empire is more necessary in the twenty-first century than ever before,” I do agree that Americans suffer from “Imperial Denial.”  We do everything we can to ignore the fact that we can, do, and will “leave our mark” on others throughout the world, transforming their cultures to more closely resemble ours.  And this complicates our nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, nation-building that should never have occurred.  The U.S. is slowly learning that in Iraq, Iraqis need to be in charge of their own futures.  The more pressure there is, the more reactive the Iraqi society becomes, either through the escalation of direct violence as occurred in late 2006, or by direct opposition by the Iraqi government to the desires of the U.S. such as Maliki’s call for troop withdrawals.

The time has long past for the Americans to finally let Iraqis handle their political and security future, respect their sovereignty, and leave Iraq.

Topics: Iraq | No Comments »

We Can Solve It

By BrianHull | July 18, 2008

There are a lot of issues out there that are complicated.  The production and use of energy is one of them.  But as the human society comes closer to the tipping point, it becomes increasingly more urgent to work together and collectively solve the growing energy problem the world is facing.  The technology is there to greatly increase the production and use of clean alternative fuels.  What we need now is the political will.  And equally important is the public’s demand for change and cooperation in decreasing their individual consumption.  Are you ready?

Topics: Environment, Energy | No Comments »

Holy Moly, a New Blog Post!!!

By BrianHull | June 29, 2008

Well, I have to be honest, it’s been nice neglecting my blog for the past six months. I’d like to say that my long blogging hiatus is over, but I don’t want to jump to any conclusions. It’s been a busy half year and with this new blog posting I want to update some faithful readers about my life before I discuss something that I have been thinking about but haven’t found the time or motivation to actually write… until now.

I graduated from Rhode Island College on May 17 with a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science. It was a pleasant accomplishment and something I had wanted to do for a while, so it’s nice to finally be done. It was exciting to graduate summa cum laude with a 4.0GPA too. I’ll eventually go to graduate school and get a Master’s Degree in Public Policy, focusing on Urban, Social Welfare, or Immigration Policy. I haven’t actually decided yet because it all depends on where my life (and future wife – see below) takes me. I still want to get more involved in state politics, so I’m leaning towards either Urban or Social Welfare, because immigration should be handled at the federal level. But immigration studies really interests me, and I think there are too few people at the state level who truly understand immigration flows, or the costs and benefits of immigrant populations in urban communities. It’s just too easy to be overly simplistic about immigration, scapegoating them for unrelated problems. I suppose the same can be said about most issues.

Anyway, another exciting tidbit of news is that I’ll be getting married on March 28, 2009 to the most wonderful woman, Kirsten. She’s awesome, brilliant, caring, and loving, and will be a doctor soon after our wedding. Her residency and National Health Service Corps commitment may bring us to different parts of the country each for 4 years, so things are a little uncertain at the moment and my life is in a state of flux. I’m actually taking our marriage and our impending move as an opportunity to change careers, moving away from photography and getting more involved in government and politics (see above), but with her medical residency and her commitment, the locations are still unknown. It’s fairly likely that we’ll be able to stay in Rhode Island during her residency, but it’s unlikely during her commitment.

Thirdly, I recently had skin cancer removed from my face, leaving a 4 inches scar along my cheek and jaw. While I was originally nervous about the scar, it actually isn’t bad and will soon fade (soon being completely relative, of course) after about 18 months. There have been other events in my life that have also been important, difficult, fun, profound, exciting, etc., but I shall not bore you with them.

There are a few things that I’ve been thinking about with regard to politics that I still think need to be discussed. With the end of the Democratic primary battle and the start of the general election season I had a hope that the contest between Barack Obama and John McCain would be a civil and passionate debate of ideas, policies, and ideology, and would avoid the overly-simplistic and irrational rhetorical messages meant to create wedges in the electorate. But looking back at the primary contest between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, two individuals with very little policy differences between them, seeing how hostile and bitter it was, there’s not much use in imaging things would be any different in the general election. It’s too bad actually, because after the 2004 campaign, when partisan groups reached new lows with attack ads and character assassinations, I had hoped that the “change” candidate(s) would usher in a new era of political discourse.

I would like to think that both candidates would appreciate a civil campaign, but unfortunately elections do not exist in vacuums. The various partisan interest groups will debase the campaign as happens in every election cycle. The candidates’ handlers will deem it necessary to pander to certain groups for electoral advantage. And the dialogue between the candidates will be edited to 6 second sound bites and be completely taken out of context to divide the nation into “us versus them,” “liberals versus conservatives,” and “Democrats versus Republicans.”

The whole concept of civility in politics is a farce anyway. Unfortunately, American politics is not about reasoned debate and a policy development process which seeks to best solve social problems. American politics is about winning elections, about creating a majority in government that can ram through its policy preferences without regard for other points of view or listening to reasoned information which conflicts with the majority’s worldview. Compromise exists solely for pragmatic purposes and only because of the relatively equal proportion of Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. Neither party can get what it wants all the time (although Republicans are much more effective at getting what they want most of the time). Bargaining is the suboptimal alternative to effective problem-solving in a democracy like the United States (no, I’m not advocating for anything different than democracy).

When times get tough and there isn’t enough surplus money to go around and pay for everyone’s projects, legislators get nasty and political discourse gets lower. When politics is actually about weighing the advantages and disadvantages of proposals and projects, when tradeoffs and preferences need to be made, the legislative process breaks down and the results are often not in the public’s best interest. This is due, specifically, to the differences in everyone’s definitions of “the public” and “best interest.”

As a case in point, let’s turn our attention to the recently passed 2009 state budget for Rhode Island. With a deficit of about $425 million, an economy lagging behind its regional neighbors, an unemployment rate of 7.2% - much higher than the national average, and elections coming up in November, the legislators in Rhode Island were in a bind. Reason, logic, and factual information dictate policy choices which were all but excluded in the state. Rather, almost every single legislator in Rhode Island, a state dominated by Democrats, decided to take the politically expedient route and cut social service programs for the poor and disadvantaged rather than raise taxes (or more accurately reinstate the capital gains tax and eliminate the alternate flat tax which largely benefits the wealthiest of Rhode Islanders). A few of the cuts made in the $6.89 billion budget include: non-education aid to cities and towns which will force cities and towns to raise property taxes to fund municipal services, the Family Independence Program, Meals on Wheels, the Rhode Island Community Food Bank, Head Start (early childhood education), Crossroads Rhode Island (RI’s largest homeless shelter), reduced spending on public colleges, etc. I call it politically expedient because the majority of the cuts were made to programs which primarily serve those who do not vote or even pay attention to politics.

A more logical, efficient, and economically advantageous decision, but politically dangerous, would have been to increase reinstate the capital gains tax and eliminate the alternative flat tax while protecting services for the less advantaged. The data exists which shows this type of economic agenda is less destructive to the economy, especially one which is a recession. To quote an article I wrote for the Rhode Island Democratic Party back in January:

A cut in social welfare spending will not only harm those who are economically disadvantaged, it will harm the entire Rhode Island economy more than an increase in taxes. This is due to the aforementioned propensity to consume. Additionally, while some of us spend all or most of our money, there are others who spend only some of it and save the rest of it. An extra dollar of income is relatively less valuable for someone making over $200,000 a year than it is for an individual making $11.50 an hour. Individuals with fewer dollars to spend a month are more likely to spend more of their dollars than are those with much greater resources. The wealthier are much more likely to save a larger proportion of their income, so the additional impact on the economy would be compounded by their savings rate. As those in the lower economic brackets see larger reductions in their benefits, the economic impact would be much more profound than a tax increase on those with high economic resources would be.

There are always tradeoffs in politics, I understand this. Unfortunately for the vast majority of us, facts are generally irrelevant to those in positions of government power. Rather the basis of most government decisions is that of expediency, collusions, and compromises which only bring suboptimal results. I wish long-term benefits outweighed the short-term costs which elected officials are all too concerned about.

Topics: Politics, Economy, Taxes, Personal, Welfare | No Comments »

Weapons not Coming from Iran

By BrianHull | May 13, 2008

A plan to show some alleged Iranian-supplied explosives to journalists last week in Karbala and then destroy them was canceled after the United States realized none of them was from Iran. A U.S. military spokesman attributed the confusion to a misunderstanding that emerged after an Iraqi Army general in Karbala erroneously reported the items were of Iranian origin.

When U.S. explosives experts went to investigate, they discovered they were not Iranian after all.

So, all this talk about Iran supplying weapons to Iraq to kill U.S. soldiers is all bullshit. Can we not bomb Iran now?

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Topics: Iraq, Iran | Comments Off

Hillary is a liar, it’s that simple….

By BrianHull | April 17, 2008

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Topics: Elections | Comments Off

Republicans Aren’t Doing Well with Fundraising

By BrianHull | April 17, 2008

This is nice….

Several of the GOP’s most highly touted candidates posted mediocre fundraising numbers in this year’s first quarter, raising questions about their ability to seriously compete in races that were once at the top of the Republican radar screen.

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Topics: Elections | Comments Off

Testimony by William E. Odom

By BrianHull | April 4, 2008

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON IRAQ

By William E. Odom, LT General, USA, Ret.
2 April 2008

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you again. The last occasion was in January 2007, when the topic was the troop surge. Today you are asking if it has worked.

Last year I rejected the claim that it was a new strategy. Rather, I said, it is a new tactic used to achieve the same old strategic aim, political stability. And I foresaw no serious prospects for success. I see no reason to change my judgment now. The surge is prolonging instability, not creating the conditions for unity as the president claims.

Last year, General Petraeus wisely declined to promise a military solution to this political problem, saying that he could lower the level of violence, allowing a limited time for the Iraqi leaders to strike a political deal. Violence has been temporarily reduced but today there is credible evidence that the political situation is far more fragmented. And currently we see violence surge in Baghdad and Basra. In fact, it has also remained sporadic and significant in several other parts of Iraq over the past year, notwithstanding the notable drop in Baghdad and Anbar Province.

More disturbing, Prime Minister Maliki has initiated military action and then dragged in US forces to help his own troops destroy his Shiite competitors. This is a political setback, not a political solution. Such is the result of the surge tactic.

No less disturbing has been the steady violence in the Mosul area, and the tensions in Kirkuk between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomen. A showdown over control of the oil fields there surely awaits us. And the idea that some kind of a federal solution can cut this Gordian knot strikes me as a wild fantasy, wholly out of touch with Kurdish realities.

Also disturbing is Turkey’s military incursion to destroy Kurdish PKK groups in the border region. That confronted the US government with a choice: either to support its NATO ally, or to make good on its commitment to Kurdish leaders to insure their security. It chose the former, and that makes it clear to the Kurds that the United States will sacrifice their security to its larger interests in Turkey.

Turning to the apparent success in Anbar province and a few other Sunni areas, this is not the positive situation it is purported to be. Certainly violence has declined as local Sunni shieks have begun to cooperate with US forces. But the surge tactic cannot be given full credit. The decline started earlier on Sunni initiative. What are their motives? First, anger at al Qaeda operatives and second, their financial plight.

Their break with al Qaeda should give us little comfort. The Sunnis welcomed anyone who would help them kill Americans, including al Qaeda. The concern we hear the president and his aides express about a residual base left for al Qaeda if we withdraw is utter nonsense. The Sunnis will soon destroy al Qaeda if we leave Iraq.

The Kurds do not allow them in their region, and the Shiites, like the Iranians, detest al Qaeda. To understand why, one need only take note of the al Qaeda public diplomacy campaign over the past year or so on internet blogs. They implore the United States to bomb and invade Iran and destroy this apostate Shiite regime.

As an aside, it gives me pause to learn that our vice president and some members of the Senate are aligned with al Qaeda on spreading the war to Iran.

Let me emphasize that our new Sunni friends insist on being paid for their loyalty. I have heard, for example, a rough estimate that the cost in one area of about 100 square kilometers is $250,000 per day. And periodically they threaten to defect unless their fees are increased. You might want to find out the total costs for these deals forecasted for the next several years, because they are not small and they do not promise to end. Remember, we do not own these people. We merely rent them. And they can break the lease at any moment. At the same time, this deal protects them to some degree from the government’s troops and police, hardly a sign of political reconciliation.

Now let us consider the implications of the proliferating deals with the Sunni strongmen. They are far from unified among themselves. Some remain with al Qaeda. Many who break and join our forces are beholden to no one. Thus the decline in violence reflects a dispersion of power to dozens of local strong men who distrust the government and occasionally fight among themselves. Thus the basic military situation is far worse because of the proliferation of armed groups under local military chiefs who follow a proliferating number of political bosses.

This can hardly be called greater military stability, much less progress toward political consolidation, and to call it fragility that needs more time to become success is to ignore its implications. At the same time, Prime Minister Maliki’s military actions in Basra and Baghdad, indicate even wider political and military fragmentation. We are witnessing is more accurately described as the road to the Balkanization of Iraq, that is, political fragmentation. We are being asked by the president to believe that this shift of so much power and finance to so many local chieftains is the road to political centralization. He describes the process as building the state from the bottom up.

I challenge you to press the administration’s witnesses this week to explain this absurdity. Ask them to name a single historical case where power has been aggregated successfully from local strong men to a central government except through bloody violence leading to a single winner, most often a dictator. That is the history of feudal Europe’s transformation to the age of absolute monarchy. It is the story of the American colonization of the west and our Civil War. It took England 800 years to subdue clan rule on what is now the English-Scottish border. And it is the source of violence in Bosnia and Kosovo.

How can our leaders celebrate this diffusion of power as effective state building? More accurately described, it has placed the United States astride several civil wars. And it allows all sides to consolidate, rearm, and refill their financial coffers at the US expense.

To sum up, we face a deteriorating political situation with an over extended army. When the administration’s witnesses appear before you, you should make them clarify how long the army and marines can sustain this band-aid strategy.

The only sensible strategy is to withdraw rapidly but in good order. Only that step can break the paralysis now gripping US strategy in the region. The next step is to choose a new aim, regional stability, not a meaningless victory in Iraq. And progress toward that goal requires revising our policy toward Iran. If the president merely renounced his threat of regime change by force, that could prompt Iran to lessen its support to Taliban groups in Afghanistan. Iran detests the Taliban and supports them only because they will kill more Americans in Afghanistan as retaliation in event of a US attack on Iran. Iran’s policy toward Iraq would also have to change radically as we withdraw. It cannot want instability there. Iraqi Shiites are Arabs, and they know that Persians look down on them. Cooperation between them has its limits.

No quick reconciliation between the US and Iran is likely, but US steps to make Iran feel more secure make it far more conceivable than a policy calculated to increase its insecurity. The president’s policy has reinforced Iran’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons, the very thing he purports to be trying to prevent.

Withdrawal from Iraq does not mean withdrawal from the region. It must include a realignment and reassertion of US forces and diplomacy that give us a better chance to achieve our aim.

A number of reasons are given for not withdrawing soon and completely. I have refuted them repeatedly before but they have more lives than a cat. Let try again me explain why they don’t make sense.

First, it is insisted that we must leave behind military training element with no combat forces to secure them. This makes no sense at all. The idea that US military trainers left alone in Iraq can be safe and effective is flatly rejected by several NCOs and junior officers I have heard describe their personal experiences. Moreover, training foreign forces before they have a consolidated political authority to command their loyalty is a windmill tilt. Finally, Iraq is not short on military skills.

Second, it is insisted that chaos will follow our withdrawal. We heard that argument as the “domino theory” in Vietnam. Even so, the path to political stability will be bloody regardless of whether we withdraw or not. The idea that the United States has a moral responsibility to prevent this ignores that reality. We are certainly to blame for it, but we do not have the physical means to prevent it. American leaders who insist that it is in our power to do so are misleading both the public and themselves if they believe it.

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